Previous works about privacy preserving serial data publishing on dynamic databases have relied on unrealistic assumptions of the nature of dynamic databases. In many applications, some sensitive values changes freely while others never change. For example, in medical applications, the disease attribute changes with time when patients recover from one disease and develop another disease. However, patients do not recover from some diseases such as HIV. We call such diseases permanent sensitive values. To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing solutions handle these realistic issues. We propose a novel anonymization approach called HD-composition to solve the above problems. Extensive experiments with real data confirm our theoretical results.
INTRODUCTION
Data mining on databases is quite useful. However, publishing data related to individuals to public may compromise individual privacy. For example, a hospital may release patient diagnosis records so that data analysts and researchers can study the characteristics of various diseases. The raw data, also called microdata, contain the identities of individuals such as names or keys which should not be released in order to protect individual privacy. However, if an adversary has access to the publicly available voter registration list 1 , s/he can discover a large portion of patients' identities by joining the published table and the voter registration list on some attributes such as Age, Sex and Zipcode, which are called quasi-identifier attributes (QID). In recent years, studies [15, 8, 18, 1 There are many sources of such an external table. [12] . In the voter list, 87% of the voters were identifiable with just the full postal code, gender and birth date [13] . From [15] , it is reported that a city's voter list in two diskettes was purchased for twenty dollars, and was used to re-identify medical records.
Most municipalities sell population registers that include the identifiers of individuals along with basic demographics; examples include local census data, voter lists, city directories, and information from motor vehicle agencies, tax assessors, and real estate agencies

Motivation
Serial publishing for dynamic databases is often necessary when there are insertions, deletions and updates in the microdata. To our best knowledge, there are only three works targeting parts of these scenarios. The first one, proposed by Byun et, al. [1] , uses delayed publishing to avoid problems caused by insertions, but does not consider deletions and updates. The second work [2] also considers only insertions. The third one, £ -invariance [21] , considers both insertion and deletion and requires that each individual is linked to a fixed set of at least £ distinct sensitive values. Counterfeit records sometimes are added into the published table in order to protect privacy in data with deletions. However, data updates have not been considered in £ -invariance. Our work is motivated by four main challenges.
Firstly, both the QID value and sensitive value of an individual can change, while some special sensitive values should remain unchanged. For example, after a move, the postal code of an individual changes. That is, the external table such as a voter registration list can have multiple releases and changes from time to time. Also, a patient may recover from one disease but develop another disease. The motivating example for [1] and [21] is that the adversary may notice a neighbor being sent to hospital, from which s/he knows that a record for the neighbor must exist in two or more consecutive releases. They further assume that the disease attribute of the neighbor must remain the same in these releases. However, the presence of the neighbor in multiple data releases does not imply that the records for the neighbor will remain the same in terms of the sensitive value. At the same time, some sensitive values that once linked to an individual can never be unlinked. For instance, in medical records, sensitive diseases such as HIV, diabetes and cancers are to this date incurable, and therefore they are expected to persist. We call these values permanent sensitive values. Permanent sensitive values can be found in many domains of interest. Some examples are "having a pilot's qualification" and "having a criminal record".
We take £ -invariance as a representative to illustrate the inadequacy of traditional approaches for the scenarios above, by the following example. In Tables 1, [21, 23] [12k, 17k] Flu 1 [21, 23] [12k, 17k] HIV 1 [21, 23] [12k, 17k] Fever 2 [20, 26] [18k, 29k] HIV 2 [20, 26] [18k, 29k] Flu 2 [20, 26] [18k, 29k] Fever PID G.ID Age Zip. Disease 1 [20, 22] [12k, 29k] HIV 1 [20, 22] [12k, 29k] Flu 1 [20, 22] [ [21, 25] [12k, 16k] HIV 1 [21, 25] [12k, 16k] Flu 1 [21, 25] [12k, 16k] Fever 2 [20, 26] [16k, 29k] Flu 2 [20, 26] [16k, 29k] HIV 2 [20, 26] [16k, 29k] Fever are published serially at times 1, 2, and 3, respectively. It is easy to see that will be found to have HIV! However, it is not easy to extend £ -invariance to individual-based protection. For example, binding invariant signatures to individuals is not feasible, since an individual may develop new diseases that are not in the signature.
Thirdly, the knowledge model for the adversary should be realistic. Literature [1] and [21] assume that it is trivial to obtain the background knowledge of each individual's presence or absence in every snapshot of the microdata. However, gaining this kind of participation knowledge can be as hard as knowing the individual's sensitive values, because one's participation in a microdata snapshot is also confidential. For example, [10] deals with protecting the information about the presence of individuals in a data release. A more plausible scenario is that an adversary knows the participation knowledge of a few close friends.
Fourthly, suppression (removing a record that should exist) is better than counterfeit (a deleted record is not deleted). If a rare but deadly disease such as SARS is suppressed in the published data, we can still broadcast the existence of such a disease without breaching privacy. On the other hand, if a record of SARS is counterfeited but is known to be wiped out, the counterfeit will be discovered and lose its protection power for the previous releases.
Contribution
This paper presents a first study of the problem of privacy preserving serial data publishing with permanent sensitive values and dynamic registration lists. We analyze the difficulty and show that without permanent sensitive values, traditional models such as a -diversity [8] are enough to protect privacy for serial publishing. However, with permanent sensitive values, the problem becomes very difficult. No generalization is possible if we assume the adversary possesses full participation knowledge. Fortunately, such an assumption is not realistic and we can assume limited participation knowledge instead.
We propose an anonymization method called HD-composition which involves two major roles, namely holder and decoy. The objective is to bound the probability of linkage between any individual and any sensitive value by a given threshold, e.g., 1/a . are from cohort 2, which violates the constraint of cohort-based partition.
It should be noted that our solution involves a novel idea of utilizing the assumption of a trusted data publisher and the benefit of making the anonymization process known to the public. It is obvious that the data publisher must be trusted. Otherwise, the published data cannot be used for data mining purpose. Hence, the publisher is assumed to follow the anonymization algorithm exactly. Interestingly, the knowledge of the algorithm is then helpful to protect the privacy by ensuring a proper analysis of the probability of linking individuals to sensitive values. More details will be given in Section 3.3.2. Therefore it turns out that providing more knowledge to the adversary actually helps in privacy protection, which is a surprising finding. Another interesting idea is to utilize the external information such as the voter registration lists to facilitate the anonymization. This is first suggested in [10] . The main observation is that there will typically be a lot of individuals who are in the registration list but are "absent" in a data release. These individuals can then help to anonymize the ones who are present.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formalizes the related concepts and states the problem of serial data publishing. Section 3 presents the solution HD-composition and the corresponding analytical study. Section 4 is an empirical study, demostrating the inadequacy of conventional privacy models and the cost of the proposed techniques. Section 5 surveys the previous work related to ours. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
PROBLEM DEFINITION
is generated by: (1) 
, and (3)
For example, [20, 26] [12k, 33k] Flu 1 [20, 26] [12k, 33k] HIV 1 [20, 26] [12k, 33k] Flu 1 [20, 26] [12k, 33k] Fever 1 [20, 26] [12k, 33k] Fever " ! 1 Table Series privacy if the adversary knows everyone's participation information (i.e.,
). This is because
has been found to be absent while
are still present at time 4, and one of the two HIV occurrences has disappeared. Since HIV is a permanent sensitive value, 3 5 8 must be linked to HIV. We can adopt the conventional random world assumption on the probabilistic analysis. In serial data publishing, a random world can be defined by a possible series of microdata tables, where by possible, we mean that the series could have been the original microdata tables which have generated the observed published anonymized tables and which do not violate the known knowledge. Hence, we introduce the definitions of possible table series. 
DEFINITION 5 (POSSIBLE
For the example, consider the table series in Table 1 , 
where 
HD-COMPOSITION
We propose a generalization technique called HD-composition to solve the problem in Definition 4. In HD-composition, each permanent sensitive value holder is protected by a number of decoys, which all act like holders to confuse the attacker. This basic idea is similar to that used in -anonymity and a -diversity, yet it is a dynamic setting here. It is possible that an individual is linked to more than one permanent sensitive values. Thus we shall use a permanent sensitive value as the prefix for roles, because one may serve as roles for different permanent sensitive values concurrently.
Let us formally clarify 3 basic roles in HD-composition. At any time 
Role-based Partition
For the first microdata snapshot §
, we generate § that satisfies a -diversity [8] . Then, at any time
is published, before generalizing § B
to § B
, the roles are updated as follows. 
Disease 1 [20, 25] [25k, 33k] Fever 1 [20, 25] [25k, 33k] Flu " ! 1 [20, 25] [25k, 33k] Ulcer Table 2 . After § © is published, before § ¡ is generated, roles should be updated. In order to achieve 3-scarcity, two HIV-decoys should be selected from Group 1 and Group 2 respectively. Therefore, HIV-decoy candidates must not disclose the fact that they are not HIV infected. Rolebased partition will not allow publications like § © @ in will be discovered to be an HIV-carrier with 100% certainty. Thus role-based partition prevents such a privacy breach.
Cohort-based Partition
Unfortunately, role-based partition cannot prevent the linkage exclusion problem as shown in our first motivation example in Section 1.1.
Therefore, besides role-based partition, we propose another partition principle: cohort-based partition. Our goal is that an adversary could never reach a contradiction by assuming that an To better present the ideas, we first assume no participation knowledge on the adversary's side. Also we assume no change in the reg-istration list over time. These restrictions will be relaxed in Section 3.4.
Container and Cohort
From the above discussion individuals would be assigned to cohorts. However, an individual that is initially assigned the role of a decoy may become a c -holder and in which case it must pass its role onto some other individual who then acts as if s/he has been the decoy all the time. To find such eligible replacement, we do not enter individuals directly to the cohorts. Instead, we enter a structure related to a region, where the region can contain multiple individuals so that replacements can be found within the region. Such a region is called a container. Figure 1(a) and (b) respectively. Finally, the publication §4 in Table 9 is obtained, which satisfies both the role-based partition principle and cohort-based partition principle.
DEFINITION 6 (S-CONTAINER
Container Maintenance
An c -decoy may become an c -holder and there will be replacement for such a decoy. The concept of containers enables us to easily identify a possible replacement. In the next part, we discuss details of how to maintain container instances after such updates.
To simplify our discussion of container maintenance, we make the following assumption.This assumption will be relaxed in Section 3.2.5. 
ASSUMPTION 1 (BUDDY ABUNDANCE
)
I à
of the data size. This is justified in the medical data scenario, where sensitive and persistent diseases are relatively rare, with evidence from a real dataset used in our empirical studies.
Relaxing the Buddy Assumption
At time 
Preliminary Analysis
Let us return to the example in Table 2 . HIV is a permanent sensitive value but Flu and Fever are not. The objective is to publish a generalization series that satisfies persistent a -scarcity, where a = 3. We first build three HIV-cohorts. In this example, each container instance contains only one individual which is also the owner of the container instance. Let the three cohorts be , gets a smaller chance of being linked to HIV.
Trusted Publisher based Analysis
What is missing in the above analysis is that it does not take into account the anonymization mechanism. In our approach, the adversary or the public will be provided with the additional knowledge of the HD-composition mechanism. Then, the above random possible world assumption is not accurate nor complete. The possible world model should be enriched with possibilities or random variables made relevant by the mechanism. In particular, the c -cohort formations for all c becomes one of the random variables. The same sensitive value assignment to the individuals under different cohort formations will be considered as two different possible worlds. The random world assumption is then applied on top of this model.
With the mechanism knowledge, but not knowing exactly the cohorts, first an adversary would need to consider the possible formations of the cohorts. From § and § ¡ 
s. Therefore, by the random world assumption, each of the two formation has equal probability, and the number of possible table series where each individual is linked to HIV is one-third of all the possible table series.
The above example shows that we should consider possible worlds as defined by a possible cohort formation and a possible assignment of sensitive values under the formation. We first define the term possible c -cohort formation series which is a series of consistent c -cohort formation from which § 6 ttt § r can be generated. The first condition in the above governs that a container instance will never switch from one cohort to another cohort. The second condition says that for c -holder cohorts, the owner of a container instance is never changed. With HD-composition, the container instance may become dormant but is never removed from a cohort until it joins a clique extinction, once a c -holder is assigned to be the owner of a container instance, it will not give up its ownership to another individual until the container instance goes extinct. Therefore we have the following lemma. Since each container instance conforms to the Cohort-based partition principle, and all possible instances are constructed from the anonymized groups in the published tables, each anonymized group has the same effect on each cohort. Hence each container instance has an equal chance of being included in each cohort. Within 
Participation Knowledge
Here we consider that the adversary has the knowledge of the presence and/or absence of up to individuals. We replace the buddy abundance assumption in Section 3.2.2 with the following assumption ( buddy abundance assumption): given § B
, and the cohort formation at time c -buddy will be pinned as described in Section 3.2.5. Let us call the scheme of HD-composition with the refinements in this section the refined HD-composition, the proof of the following lemma is similar to that for HD-composition. 
Anonymization Algorithm
Existing anonymization algorithms [3, 5] can be adopted for the task of HD-composition. The existing anonymization algorithms generate a number of anonymized groups, each of which satisfies some privacy requirement such as a -diversity. In this paper, we can borrow one of these algorithms by making each group in the output of these algorithms satisfy the properties of both role-based partition and cohort-based partition instead. This flexibility is a good feature since it opens the opportunity of leveraging the known anonymization algorithms to optimize HD-composition. In this paper, we adopt a top-down strategy [3] to perform the anonymization algorithm because it is found that a top-down approach often introduce less information loss in data publishing.
Specifically, each time we generate a published 
Evaluations of HD-Composition
In this part, we test HD-composition in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. Given § ¦ | ù . In order to well evaluate HD-composition, we examine 4 aspects: the portion of perturbed tuples, the utility of published tables, the computation overheads, and the additional costs for dealing with participation knowledge, as follows. In the following container size Figure 4 (a) and (b), we can find that at the first few publishing rounds, there is no perturbation at all, and the total number of perturbed tuples is tiny compared to the cardinality of microdata tables(about 0.02%). at each publishing round. We follow the literature conventions [19, 21, 17 ] to measure the error by the relative error ratio in answering an aggregate query. All the published tables are evaluated one by one. For each evaluation, we perform 5,000 randomly generated range queries which are similar to [21] on the microdata snapshot and its anonymized version, and then report the average relative error ratio. The results are plotted in Figure 5 Effect of Participation Knowledge. The last experiment investigates how the utility and computation cost change if we need to defend against the participation knowledge. We vary the quantity of participation knowledge , then at each publishing round, record the relative average query error in Figure 8 (a) and plot the computation cost in Figure 8 (b). It could be found that different cardinalities of the participation knowledge do not have drastic influence on the results.
Utility of Published
RELATED WORK
Researches on privacy protections for data publishing can be classified into two branches. The first branch is the one-time publication. The second branch is serial publication. For one-time publication, many privacy models are proposed to protect individual privacy. The traditional model is -anonymity [14, 5, 4] which requires that each QID value either appears at least times or does not appear in the published table. However, recently, it is found that -anonymity is vulnerable to homogeneity attack and background knowledge attack. One of the most influential work is a -diversity [8] , which considers the inference relationship between QID values and sensitive attributes, instead of the number of occurrences of the QID values only. Since the aim of privacy protection is to guarantee the linkage probability between one and a sensitive value is no more than a threshold, a -diversity is more meaningful than -anonymity. Li and Li [7] also consider the inference relationship and propose v -closeness which restricts that, according to the sensitive attribute, the distribution of each anonymized group is similar to the distribution of the entire published table.
Some works [8, 9, 17] for the one-time publication also consider some kinds of background knowledge. In [8] , a Japanese hardly suffers from heart disease. Martin et al. [9] propose a new kind of background knowledge considering the association among individuals. For example, if an individual is linked to a sensitive value such as HIV, another individual which has a close relationship with him/her must also be linked to the same sensitive value. Wong et al. [17] consider that the background knowledge can be the principle of the anonymization algorithm. Different from previous works, we focus on the background knowledge including the participation information which denotes whether an individual is present or not in a snapshot of the microdata.
Byun et, al. [1] adopt delayed publishing to keep a -diversity dynamically, in which the anonymized data will not be published until the inserted tuples themselves could satisfy some privacy requirements. Yet the method has several drawbacks: it only considers insertions, all the publishing histories need to be maintained, and delayed durations are not bounded. Xiao and Tao [21] propose the £ -invariance model to support both insertion and deletions. However, as we have discussed in the introduction, both of these works cannot address the problems that are identified in this paper.
Wang et al. [16] considers sequential releases where each release is on a different subset of the attributes for the same dataset. Both [11] and [2] present a privacy model to protect -anonymity with serial publications that only allow insertions. Both consider -anonymity and cannot be easily extended to the case where the inference relationship between QID and sensitive attributes is considered.
CONCLUSIONS
Current anonymization techniques for serial data publishing cannot support data updates on both QID attributes and the sensitive attribute and none of them consider the effect of permanent sensitive values. This paper addresses these issues by proposing a novel anonymization method by role composition. Utilizing the assumption of trusted publishers, we present an analysis showing that individual privacy can be guaranteed by our method. In the experiments on a real dataset, we find that our proposed algorithm HD-composition is efficient and also can preserve the utility of published data.
There are some promising directions for future work. It would be interesting to extend HD-composition to guard privacy against various kinds of background knowledge. One can also explore novel techniques to raise the utility for serial data publishing. 
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